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Abstract 
Background 
To investigate organisational factors influencing the implementation challenges of 
redesigning services for people with long term conditions in three locations in England, using 
remote care (telehealth and telecare). 
Methods 
Case-studies of three sites forming the UK Department of Health‟s Whole Systems 
Demonstrator (WSD) Programme. Qualitative research techniques were used to obtain data 
from various sources, including semi-structured interviews, observation of meetings over the 
course programme and prior to its launch, and document review. Participants were managers 
and practitioners involved in the implementation of remote care services. 
Results 
The implementation of remote care was nested within a large pragmatic cluster randomised 
controlled trial (RCT), which formed a core element of the WSD programme. To produce 
robust benefits evidence, many aspect of the trial design could not be easily adapted to local 
circumstances. While remote care was successfully rolled-out, wider implementation lessons 
and levels of organisational learning across the sites were hindered by the requirements of the 
RCT. 
Conclusions 
The implementation of a complex innovation such as remote care requires it to organically 
evolve, be responsive and adaptable to the local health and social care system, driven by 
support from front-line staff and management. This need for evolution was not always 
aligned with the imperative to gather robust benefits evidence. This tension needs to be 
resolved if government ambitions for the evidence-based scaling-up of remote care are to be 
realised. 
Keywords 
Telecare, Telehealth, Whole system redesign, Organisational change, Adoption, 
Implementation, Ethnographic methods 
Background 
The need for new models of integrated care that can reduce the costs of keeping people out of 
care homes and hospitals is an imperative for heath and social care systems around the world. 
The use of „remote care‟ technologies (telecare and telehealth) as integral to new models of 
care is seen by the UK government as one potential solution [1]. Since the mid 2000s, a 
number of programmes have been launched in the UK to stimulate the adoption of remote 
care, including in the Department of Health‟s Whole System Demonstrator (WSD) 
programme. The WSD had two main goals. The demonstration aspect refers to delivering a 
model that results in more integrated working practices across the NHS (health care) and 
Local Authorities (social care) at organisational and routine service delivery levels, 
supplanting traditional models of care through increased use of telehealth and telecare 
services. The second goal was to test the wide scale impact of telehealth (the remote 
exchange of data between a patient, at home, and health care professionals, to assist in the 
management of an existing long-term condition i.e. COPD, diabetes, heart failure), and 
telecare, (the remote, automatic monitoring of an individuals‟ personal health and safety, i.e. 
mobility, and home environment). At the start of the WSD programme, although there was 
some evidence for the clinical and cost effectiveness of telehealth and telecare [2-4], the 
evidence base was not so rigorous that wide-scale national adoption has been achieved [5,6]. 
Combined implementation and evaluation of remote care is complex, with the ease of the task 
and the success achieved often overestimated [5,7]. Despite the Government promoting the 
concept [6,8], many seemingly successful telehealth and telecare projects fade away [9,10]. 
The idea of using remote care as a driver of whole-system working and integration has been 
seen politically as attractive [1], with this concept largely treated as „self-evident and readily 
available for operational use‟ [11]. In reality the term a „whole system‟ approach is used 
ubiquitously and tends to be a non-specific policy goal, with what it means, and how it could 
be achieved left ambiguous [11,12]. In this instance it has been used to denote telecare as part 
of a joined-up health and social care system. By commissioning this work the UK 
Department of Health wanted to move away from remote care merely as a „good idea‟, by 
providing future policy makers with formal and definitive „proof‟ that this technology worked 
[8], underpinned by a normative expectation that only the outcomes of a large and robust 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) would do. The overall WSD evaluation was therefore 
nested within, reportedly, the world‟s largest RCT of remote care technologies to date [13]. 
Findings from WSD are now becoming available as they go through peer review [14,15]. The 
papers focus on (1) clinical outcomes and patient reported outcomes, (2) changes in service 
use and economic impacts, (3) service users and carers experiences, and (4) the 
organisational, supply chain, and service delivery implications for scaling-up. Whilst an RCT 
may provide a suitable vehicle for demonstrating the impact of clinical and cost effectiveness, 
determining the „success‟ of policy concepts such as „whole system‟ change is more 
challenging [8,11,12]. Currently, we have varying degrees of knowledge about the impact of 
innovative technologies on different aspects of the health and social care system [7,9] but 
require knowledge about how these elements recursively interact to achieve whole system 
integration and change [16]. To investigate this question we drew on a body of work that 
explores the task of evaluating services making the transition from clinical trials to more 
mainstream normalized services [5,6,8,12,17], and also embedded our approach within a 
wider body of literature on socio-technical change in complex organisational settings [18-20]. 
This body of work emphasises a constructionist ontology and interpretative epistemology in 
which the constituent parts of a system cannot be understood objectively, or in isolation, but 
need to be situated in dynamic relation to how different stakeholders „make-sense‟ of the 
context and system around them [7,8,20,21]. 
Research objectives 
We were tasked with conducting an organisational evaluation, in parallel with service 
delivery implementation and an RCT. Our aim was to better understand the interconnections 
that exist between policy, organisational environments, contextual influences (e.g. history of 
remote care involvement at each site) and the programme intervention itself. In particular, we 
were interested in understanding the interaction of organisational factors that would assist in 
the successful large scale implementation of remote care. Essentially, we explored the 
context, mechanisms, and outcome relationships between different stakeholders across the 
system, by asking „what makes sense and works, for whom, and under what conditions‟ [21]. 
A fundamental challenge for the sites was the anticipated tensions between differing 
organisational priorities: (1) to maintain an effective intervention at a high level of quality 
and create robust scientific evidence about the technologies in use and (2) to establish 
practices and systems in place that could foster sustainable use of the technologies in the 
future; nationwide, beyond the WSD programme. 
Methods 
We conducted an in-depth, comparative, longitudinal analysis of the implementation of 
telehealth and telecare within the three sites, focusing both on processes and outcomes. The 
case study method is particularly useful where the range of issues is wide, the concepts are 
related to each other in complex ways [22] and context is important [23]. 
Case study sites 
Each WSD site was chosen by the Department of Health in 2006 through a competitive 
process because (a) they were considered the most likely to succeed in scaling up remote care 
as part of a whole system redesign and (b) they were considered representative of the range of 
local health and social care systems in the UK. Each site is a region of England (Cornwall, 
Kent, London Borough of Newham) comprising one or two (Kent) health authorities (i.e. 
Primary Care Trusts) and geographically superimposed Local Authorities, with responsibility 
for social care. Each of the three sites has its own particular characteristics and population 
health needs and demands. Newham has a multi-ethnic community with high levels of 
economic, social and educational deprivation. Kent comprises of a mixed urban and rural 
environment, with varying levels of economic and social development. Cornwall is 
predominantly rural, a large, sparsely populated area with a large elderly population and poor 
transport links. The sites began work in 2008, to develop care models based around the 
introduction of new telecare and telehealth services. Implementation was nested within a 
large pragmatic cluster-randomised controlled trial (RCT). Pragmatic RCTs are more flexible 
to adjust to real life conditions, and useful when the both the context and the intervention 
itself (telecare and telehealth) are complex [24]. The trial was developed with two parallel 
treatment arms to assess the effectiveness of telehealth and telecare on healthcare utilisation/ 
costs and cost-effectiveness relative to standard care over a 12-month period [13]. All study 
sites had exactly the same type of patients enrolled in the trial, and received the same 
interventions. This was a stringent condition of the protocol. Each site had a local WSD 
Project Team with responsibility for implementing the trials in their region in line with the 
protocols provided by the WSD Evaluation Team. The WSD Project Teams‟ responsibilities 
included: identifying and recruiting eligible participants; installing and maintaining telehealth 
or telecare devices for intervention participants; training participants (and professionals) in 
the use of the telehealth and telecare; providing monitoring centre services; providing usual 
health and social care to all participants; providing local organisational and management 
resources as required to support the trial. The WSD Project Teams comprised of existing staff 
from the local Primary Care Trust (Cornwall), Social Services (Kent) or a combination of 
both (Newham). All WSD Project Teams were supported by frontline clinical and technical 
staff. Implementation was supported across local sites by involvement of the voluntary sector, 
the private sector and expert patient and carer groups, who advised on the types of technology 
employed, helped to source patients, and advised on patient information needs. An external 
management consultancy appointed by the Department of Health provided additional 
programme support. For a detailed outline of the trial methods see Bower et al [13]. By 
attending early evaluation team meetings, we observed that taking part in the trial was 
perceived by the organisations as an exciting opportunity, that the trial would provide them 
with the financial and management support (Department of Health funding and a team of 
specialist management consultants) they needed to deploy telehealth, in particular, on a large 
scale. Bidding to be part of the WSD programme had been rigorous, and the site teams felt 
privileged to be given the opportunity to develop new services that would not otherwise have 
been afforded. However, once the trial got underway excitement was tempered by the level of 
work involved in developing new services and using technology standardised within the 
context of an RCT, and by the effort of ensuring that large numbers of trial participants were 
recruited within a relatively short timeframe (see below). 
Data collected 
Qualitative, ethnographic data was collected across the sites between June 2008 and July 
2011 (see Table 1). Each site had a dedicated management team charged with rolling out the 
programme, recruiting staff and reviewing progress. They also facilitated and co-ordinated 
installation of the technology, and oversaw recruitment, assessment and monitoring of 
patients in the trial. We purposively sampled and interviewed everyone in each site within 
their management teams, as well as other staff strategically involved in implementation. No-
one we approached refused to participate in our study. Saturation of the findings was reached 
approximately half way through each of our three phases of data collection (each data 
collection phase represented a different stage of the programme), with the same themes re-
emerging across different groups. The emphasis in the interviews was on key decisions taken 
by local health and social care stakeholders involved in the WSD programme, and their 
impact on implementation outcomes. Interviews covered the role of strategic policy, 
operational decisions and targets, and relationships between the organisations and different 
professional groups within the care system. We explored the impact of the WSD programme 
on local implementation practices, and on closing the traditional cultural and practice gap 
between health and social care. Over the trial period we conducted 115 interviews, 
triangulated with 92 strategic documents and 174 hours of ethnographic observations (see 
Table 1). Before data collection began the study was approved by Liverpool Research Ethics 
Committee (ref: 08/H1005/4). The data presented is part of much larger body of work 
currently being written up by the authors. 
Table 1 Data collection June 2008 - July 2011 
Study timetable Interviews 
conducted 
Observations (on site and strategic 
meetings) 
Document review 
Pre-trial phase: Planning and early 
implementation July – Oct. 2008 
5 LA managers 11 x 3 hr local site management meetings 14 meeting notes 
 1 NHS manager 2 x 3 hr strategic WSD team board meetings 1 WSD evaluation proposal 
 8 other associated 
staff 
 1 ministerial document 
 1 x 4 hr national remote care expert network 
meeting 
3 presentations regarding remote care progress 
and initiatives in the UK 
Total: 14 43 hours 19 documents 
Phase I: Participant recruitment and 
clinical engagement 
14 LA managers 10 x 3 hr local site management meetings 17 meeting notes 
14 NHS managers 5 x 3 hr strategic WSD team board meetings 3 site project management documents, 1 
Newham telecare care model overview, 1 
Newham telecare procedures and 1 Newham 
telehealth response interim care pathway 
documents 
Nov. 2008 – Mar. 2008 3 joint LA & NHS 
managers 
4 x 4 hr national remote care expert network 
meetings 
   12 presentations about remote care progress and 
initiatives in the UK 
Total: 31 57 hours 35 documents 
Phase II: Delayed delivery group joins 
the trial and the focus shifts to evaluation 
Sept. 2009 - Oct. 2010 
14 LA managers 10 x 3 hr local site management meetings 20 meeting notes 
 14 NHS managers 3 x 3 hr strategic WSD board meetings 1 telehealth pilot report 
15 presentations about remote care progress and 
initiatives in the UK 1 joint LA & NHS 
manager 
5 x 4 hr national remote care expert network 
meetings, 1 x 6 hr conference and 1 x 3hr 
launch of Kent telehealth pilot event 
Total: 29 68 hours 36 documents 
Phase III: Business continuity plans and 
early mainstreaming days April – July 
2011 
10 LA managers 2 x 3hr local site management meetings 2 meeting notes 
14 NHS managers 
17 other associated 
staff 
Total: 41 6 hours 2 documents 
Overall total: 115 interviews 174 hours of observations 92 documents 
Data analysis 
Our organisational analysis drew on recent innovation research [18,20,25] and normalisation 
process theory [19]. In paying attention and situating the findings within the dynamic 
complexity of the system, we mainly drew on the work of Greenhalgh and colleagues [20,21] 
and earlier work on the implementation of remote care and healthcare ICT [26-28]. When 
examining the socially constructed meanings of different stakeholders, we found the 
sensemaking work of Weick useful [29]. Data was analysed in three stages. Our analytic 
process drew on the structured and systematic approach of coding and theme abstraction [30]. 
To ensure reliability, two members of our team independently read interview transcripts to 
agree on the emerging themes. The reliability of our interpretation of the data was further 
established by drawing on additional data collected from the informal interviews, through 
observations and from project documentation (see Table 2). 
Table 2 Study site characteristics 
Sites Cornwall Kent Newham Overall Total 
WSD Organisational lead Cornwall Primary Care Trust Kent County Council London Borough of Newham  
Telecare users pre-trial <1000 c.2000 c.2500 5500 
Telehealth users pre-trial 0 c.200 0 200 
Trial telecare users     
Intervention group 545 427 304 1276 
Control group 492 462 370 1324 
Total 1037 889 674 2600 
Trial telehealth users     
Intervention group 566 583 456 1605 
Control group 625 595 405 1625 
Total 1191 1178 861 3230 
Overall numbers (telehealth/telecare) 2228 2067 1535 5830 
Results 
By the end of the WSD programme telehealth and telecare had been rolled out across all three 
sites, with 2,281 participants in the intervention group and 2,949 in the control group (see 
Table 2). 
Whole system redesign 
In the original WSD research protocol, three types of participants were to be recruited: those 
assessed as eligible for telecare, those assessed for telehealth, and a mixed group assessed as 
eligible for both [13]. However, early on in the trial it became clear that there were not the 
numbers expected, hence recruitment of participants with mixed care needs proved difficult. 
Some site managers attributed this to population demographics, but the majority of the staff 
believed that this group failed to be identified and recruited due to the strict RCT recruitment 
conditions. Whatever the reason, a lack of recruitment meant this group was not included as a 
separate category in the trial. This decision had far-reaching strategic consequences for the 
sites and their overall goal of demonstrating the advantages of whole system redesign and of 
providing implementation lessons for scaling-up. Health care and social care staff no longer 
needed to work together to deliver care for this mixed group. Subsequently, telecare and 
telehealth no longer acted as a combined driver for the redesign of care services, and for 
developing new levels of integration, because the two services remained as before, largely 
independent, with a range of associated but separate processes. 
I would describe it actually not as being a whole system…because of the 
segregation between telehealth and telecare. I think we’ve called it whole 
system and it’s not. I think it is two separate systems that have the potential of 
being the whole but… as part of the trial there was no group which had both 
telehealth and telecare equipment installed… It wasn’t a proper evaluation 
strand…it should have been (senior manager). 
In addition, new systems for data sharing across health and social care sectors failed to be 
developed, and the need for new organisational processes and staff that seamlessly spanned 
both sectors was also eliminated. Alongside any strategic vision of integrated processes, the 
organisational will to develop an integrated model around new combined telecare and 
telehealth services was dissipated. The lack of integration was not only due to RCT selection 
criteria. There appeared to be a lack of organisational readiness. Here readiness is defined as 
the degree to which the cases involved were prepared to participate and succeed in this 
endeavour [31,32]. We also considered the extent to which the organisations and individuals 
within it perceived the change as needed [32,33]. As one clinician put it; „As an organisation, 
are they ready to change completely the way they work? And are there clinicians ready for 
that…I think we have proved often that they aren’t.’ To take part in the programme, sites 
hadto demonstrate “a history of successful partnership working across health and social care, 
e.g. joint health and social care teams which provide comprehensive and integrated 
packages”, and show “evidence of a clear plan for a whole system approach” [1]. However, 
the development of „whole system‟ strategies and activities that should have commenced at 
the start of the programme was never pursued. Managers did not elucidate nuanced 
understandings of „whole system‟ working or redesign. Overall, they were unconcerned about 
the specific goal of increased integration, which was seen as largely unrealistic and secondary 
to the development of expanded remote care services, seen as essential for improving patient 
care. Despite, the pre-trial conditions, we found that whole system working was not a large 
part of the culture being enacted and driven by staff. In practice, there was little evidence of 
integrated services, or any move towards integration, with services largely operating within 
traditional cultural, structural and financial silos and sector boundaries. 
A person in the NHS cannot create a care package in social services even 
though they’ve been talking about how to do it for the last five years and I can 
see why, because the NHS doesn’t want… well the council doesn’t want the 
NHS spending its budget. While you can talk about philosophy as much as you 
like, until there’s an integrated budget system, it’s never going to work 
(healthcare professional). 
The WSD programme may not have led to the „whole system‟ change, in terms of „truly 
integrated services’ and a „radical and sustained shift in the way in which services are 
delivered’, but engagement in the programme, nevertheless, strengthened existing links 
between health and social care. Improved communication due to the work of rolling out 
telehealth services in particular, acted as a catalyst for building relationships and for the joint 
ownership of new care processes and goals. For example, specialist community nurses 
responsible for telehealth monitoring worked closely with social care staff to ensure the new 
services fitted within patient‟s existing care packages and that all members of the care team 
were kept informed and updated. The act of „bringing people together’ was seen as a 
significant challenge and an important outcome in its own right, a rare „gem‟ afforded by the 
dedicated work and funding attached to the programme. Interviewees felt that implementing 
the WSD programme helped to identify duplications in the existing services provided, and 
enabled them to work more closely around the needs of individual patients. However, many 
of these positive changes appear attached to the particular hard work of trying to get 
telehealth implemented, within the WSD trial. 
Implementation challenges in the context of an RCT 
The pragmatic design of the RCT allowed for a degree of flexibility, with local sites able to 
choose some criteria for patient inclusion. Despite this flexibility, standardised elements of 
trial, such as participant recruitment processes, were perceived as problematic to local 
implementation processes. Local managers felt that the RCT evaluation required a „one size 
fits all‟ approach that overrode local contextual differences in terms of population needs and 
prior experiences. For example, the majority of WSD participant recruitment was conducted 
via general practice lists, whereas previously local assessments had been conducted by local 
staff who visited patient‟s homes, such as occupational therapists. According to one 
interviewee, 
(We were) all about how you use telehealth and telecare to improve health 
and social care for your population, which had nothing to do with randomised 
control trials. It caused massive damage in terms of what we would have been 
doing, because we had to stop doing what was obvious, which was helping 
those people that benefit most, and alter the direction of travel… Encouraging 
social services to refer their clients that could benefit from this was destroyed 
by the randomised control trial… So, it was very destructive in a sense (senior 
manager). 
Managers expressed the view that the sites needed to deviate from previous „real-life‟ models 
of assessment and service delivery and create new trial-specific ones. During this process, 
some existing relationships and partnerships between stakeholders were damaged, and 
organisational goodwill was lost. As reported in other work [8] it was difficult for social and 
health care staff to morally accept that due to the randomisation requirements of the RCT, 
some people assessed as needing a service had to wait before the equipment was supplied: 
We’re very restricted in relation to WSD and, in fact, some of the people we 
referred to be included as part of WSD never got the kit … which leaves a bad 
taste because they did fit the criteria (social care professional). 
Previous telehealth and telecare services in Kent and Newham were led by local authority 
social services. To try and maximise previous learning both sites decided to keep this model. 
Partly with the aid of previous funding [34] telecare has already been widely implemented 
across the UK, and in two of the three demonstrator sites. Previous telecare experience 
assisted with recruitment but the fact that the sites could not use existing users in the RCT 
reduced the recruitment pool, leading to delays. 
We had already stripped out of Newham all of those people who could most 
benefit from telecare so they are outside of the trial… Anybody that really 
thought about where to actually do this would not choose somebody that had 
already done telecare (middle manager). 
Another challenge was the perceived uneven focus of the trial design, focusing separately on 
telecare and telehealth, with the latter seen as the most innovative part of the WSD trial. 
There was a strong sense that the RCT was more focused on telehealth rather than telecare 
interventions. 
Telehealth had a far greater exposure and it’s definite that the focus of the 
WSD was on the health service. Social care was always seen as an aside… It 
was very, very health focused, looking at mainly clinical and medical 
outcomes. So, no, I think it was really biased towards the NHS (social care 
professional) 
This emphasis on telehealth was hard for sites where social care staff led the programme, due 
to new reliance on the involvement of general practitioners (GPs). This problem was partly 
overcome in Kent when GP champions were placed within leading operational roles. These 
clinicians had the power, influence and knowledge to engage nursing teams and other GPs, 
they understood the extra work involved and the need for randomisation, and unlike many 
social care staff were not resistant to the constraints the trial imposed. Cornwall had less prior 
experience of remote care than the other two sites, so came into WSD with a relatively little 
telehealth and telecare infrastructure. The relative lack of an existing remote care system 
allowed them to use clinicians from the NHS Primary Care Trust (PCT) to lead the 
programme. The process of staff engagement was easier in Cornwall due to this decision. The 
PCT saw participation in WSD as an exciting opportunity to develop new system-wide care 
models, providing a springboard for their agenda for improved chronic disease management. 
As the trial progressed, it became clear that clinical champions, placed at strategic levels, 
helped sustain senior management interest, deemed essential for moving forward. 
I think having clinical champions as well as senior clinical managers out there 
saying ‘I have had really good success with this’ - I wouldn't want to lose 
that…When you hear that positive feedback, and we've made sure that’s all 
fed through to the PCT Board, then it’s hard for the PCT to say no, we’re not 
doing this (healthcare professional). 
Organisational learning 
For telehealth and telecare to stimulate „whole system redesign‟ and integration, 
organisational flexibility and incremental, iterative learning was deemed essential by local 
management teams. However, achieving this flexibility was hindered by the requirements of 
the RCT. Many new processes, such as patient assessment and training, were set up 
according to the needs of the RCT protocol, but as large scale implementation progressed, it 
became clear that these processes were poorly aligned with the specific needs of the existing 
local context, but could not be adapted. According to one interviewee, 
There was certainly a period where we were rather locked into WSD being a 
discrete add-on service, as opposed to being an integrated whole system 
approach. That was influenced quite strongly by the need to not distort the 
evaluation process. So, we carried on doing some things that we knew were 
either expensive or just under par (middle manager). 
Unfortunately, as the programme progressed, the requirements of the RCT meant that many 
processes identified during implementation as locally sub-optimal, could not be significantly 
deviated from. As one manager put it, 
I think it has … made me realise about the limitations of RCTs. That whilst 
they are the gold standard in evidence, to some extent they don’t allow 
flexibility in terms of what you’d offer. Some of these sites have been working 
for two or three years, and I think … if left alone… they would be offering 
something different now than they were when they started, but we’ve restricted 
them from doing that (policy advisor) 
Staff reported they were able to learn about mistakes in implementing remote care, but 
keeping within the RCT protocol often meant that they could not take remedial action to 
rectify them. Not being able to put learning into practice was seen as detrimental to patient 
care. This affected staff morale and the introduction of change management strategies to 
support future large scale implementation and sustainability, after programme completion. In 
order to fit with local plans for scaling-up remote care, many of the processes developed for 
the WSD are now being gradually replaced, with the sites either developing new care models 
or reverting back to old ones. 
You have to unpick all the processes and procedures we put in place to deliver 
the RCT because they’re not good business processes. They’re too constrained 
so we’ve had to take everybody in that mind-set out of the programme 
environment (senior manager). 
Despite the impact of the RCT on the sites‟ ambitions for mainstream implementation of 
remote care, its robust nature was nevertheless seen as extremely timely and pivotal to the 
future development of remote care services, both in the UK and worldwide. Most participants 
perceived „useful‟ evidence as being partly subjective and context-specific, but they 
understood that this was not enough to „sell‟ telehealth and ensure a long-term, widespread 
commitment to adoption. As reported in other remote care work [5] the need to gather 
systematically collected before-and-after data was seen as a top priority, with clinician 
engagement being greatly enhanced by the perceived robustness of the RCT. 
Moving forward 
High levels of WSD staff turnover, and current uncertain economic conditions have all 
impacted on the sites‟ future scalability plans. Time-limited funding meant many staff were 
employed specifically for the trial, but local spending plans meant that they had little 
opportunity to stay in post once the RCT recruitment was completed. In Newham this has 
been especially problematic as nearly all staff were employed as temporary „change 
management‟ consultants. At the time of this paper all but two of these had left the 
organisation. According to one interviewee „they’ve lost all that information and experience 
that they could have used and applied and driven it forward’ (middle manager). More 
broadly, managers felt there was an over-emphasis on meeting RCT recruitment aims and 
research goals, at the expense of trying to understand the implementation levers and 
incentives that should be put in place to ensure that remote care made local business sense 
and could be further scaled-up and sustained. At the end of the RCT the sites were left 
starting from scratch in terms of building in and aligning implementation with local needs. 
The problem with the WSD programme was that … it required us by virtue of 
the numbers game to install telehealth in all sorts of people's homes. I think 
we now need to focus its use in the right places. Now that will mean taking 
some of the triallists off, and it will mean adding new patients on, where we 
are in control of the use of telehealth, rather than it being driven by the needs 
of the evaluation process (senior manager). 
Despite these setbacks, taking part in the programme has provided the sites with new 
infrastructure, equipment and resources. One of the programme achievements is that it has 
raised clinical awareness and trust in telehealth services. Many staff, originally sceptical 
about the efficacy of telehealth services, became enthused and excited by the innovation as 
their knowledge and interaction with the programme increased. 
I am one hundred and fifty percent committed and believe that telehealth is the 
way forward and I will be looking to work in a way that I can drive it forward 
and make it happen… So, absolutely it has changed me (healthcare 
professional). 
Less positively, this increased enthusiasm may provide a future source of tension if services 
developed in the programme are not scaled-up or sustained once the funding is removed. 
Concerns were raised that the telehealth services provided under WSD put increased demand 
on the local healthcare system, by serving to highlight previously hidden unmet social and 
clinical needs. The cost of meeting these unmet needs, in terms of additional resources, was 
seen as a serious barrier to scaling up. 
But I think we've also learnt that quite a component of telehealth has been 
picking up previously unmet need. My guess is that a lot of the activity on 
WSD has … made it better for people if they've been in touch with health 
services. But quite honestly, some of that need would not have been being met 
before (senior manager). 
Discussion 
The Whole System Demonstrator was specifically designed to provide more robust evidence 
of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of telehealth and telecare in the management of 
patients with long-term health conditions. In doing so, it was seen as a way of stimulating 
faster implementation of remote care. The RCT element of the evaluation means that 
questions about benefits evidence should in part be answered. However, the other aim of the 
programme, with telehealth and telecare acting as a driver for new levels of integration, and 
providing lessons for wide-scale future implementation, was less successful. 
The original WSD evaluation design attempted to combine the need for better evidence, using 
an RCT, with lessons about organisational change and strategic decision making, to better 
inform decisions about scaling up and embedding the technology into mainstream services. 
The emerging results support the recent suggestion for less of a focus on conducting RCTs in 
health, that the quest for improved evidence does not necessarily align with an RCT approach 
[5,6,8], with more research needed which looks at „wicked‟ [35] problems of the 
implementation and appropriateness of telecare/telehealth. 
The components and constituent parts of the RCT did not exist in isolation from local 
implementation needs, and as the RCT was given priority these needs often became eroded or 
skewed. As with any pragmatic evaluation of this size, the final proposed design meant a 
compromise between methodological rigour and realism. A definitive RCT was required to 
produce the robust data policy makers and commissioners have been calling for. In contrast 
to other research designs that focus on knowledge in action [19], in order to produce robust, 
reliable and universal evidence, the RCT had to be largely implemented as originally planned 
and detached from the complexities of the environment in which the organisations were 
embedded. We know that organisational implementation and working practices are 
influenced by a wide range of complex local, political and individual processes [5,6,8]. Wide-
scale rollout was not simply a question of increasing user numbers within a given domain and 
time span, and requires significant degrees of organisational learning about what works and 
what fails to work. Unfortunately, the artificiality of randomisation and associated levels of 
standardisation made a „learn, reflect and adopt‟ approach very difficult. The RCT protocol 
was not well aligned with generating scalability lessons, iterative and participative modes of 
learning, and developing new levels of service integration. Action was often not possible 
until the trial was complete. Consequently, much of the iterative learning from the 
implementation process was not implemented. 
Remote care technologies have often been positioned as a „cure all‟, in both helping address 
the western world‟s demographic time-bomb by filling gaps within the care system, and as a 
vehicle for new levels of system integration [36,37]. The White Paper from which the WSD 
programme originated states that it should „highlight the many barriers to realising this 
vision.‟ [1] The idea that remote care implementation could lead to new levels of whole 
system working was always ambitious, with how this aim would be achieved was left 
ambiguous. As others have noted [38], while policy support may increase an organisation‟s 
capacity to adopt an innovation, it will not change its strategic and cultural predisposition. 
This WSD stands out in being the largest trial of its type ever undertaken. Despite the 
resources deployed, and a comprehensive and rigorous site selection process of cases with 
past experience of telecare and telehealth, we found that in actuality the sites were not ready 
to implement this level of organisational change within the timeframe given. It appears that 
despite a rigorous site selection process, remote care was not a sufficiently powerful driver to 
significantly reduce fragmentation and discontinuities across the system, and push system 
integration significantly forward. Nor did engaging in the WSD programme create new levels 
of organisational readiness as originally envisioned. Even in Cornwall, where they started off 
with more flexibility, in that they had less devolved and of remote care working, telecare and 
telehealth did not lead to greater system integration. People from different parts of the health 
and social care system may have worked together more than previously, but the underlying 
structure of the systems in place remained largely unchanged [12]. What this study shows is 
that telehealth and telecare was successfully implemented locally without significant levels of 
system integration occurring and without the perceived need for this to happen. If work from 
the programme is to be locally sustained, perhaps the original goals of integration need to be 
redrawn in favour of more organic notions of incremental scaling-up, that pay attention to the 
evolving needs of the service-in-context as it grows [19]. While it seems unlikely that care 
system redesign on any significant scale could be implemented within the relatively short two 
year time-frame of the WSD, like previous research [6,12], these results suggest that even 
without the constraints imposed by the RCT, the „holy grail‟ of health and social care 
integration driven by remote care, is still a very long way off. What is clear is that during the 
WSD programme, the RCT protocol led to implementation models that were not sufficiently 
sensitised to local contextual differences. An important lesson is that the development of a 
remote care service cannot occur in a contextual vacuum treated as a pre-wrapped generic 
implementation package to be adapted later. Locally sensitive levers and incentives must be 
factored in and co-designed both from inception and along the way. 
Conclusions 
Our results suggest that more resources to support implementation and more evidence are not 
the whole answer to scaling-up remote care. Gathering evidence from large-scale RCTs, in 
parallel with implementation of remote care services, creates confusion. It becomes difficult 
to determine how much change is a product of trial processes, or directly attributable to 
changes in services delivery, and whether any of the observed changes will be sustainable 
[5,6,16]. In further investigating how remote care can be mainstreamed, away from the 
constraints of an RCT, the Department of Health has commissioned us to conduct parallel 
organisational research across six additional UK sites with varying levels of national and 
local government support, as well as research on the technology supply side. We are currently 
evaluating the findings. Early results suggest implementing telehealth and telecare systems 
more incrementally, at a pace that makes sense to the organisations of care in relation to their 
locally changing needs and priorities, is the best route to success. 
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